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People v. Bradshaw: Has the Appearance of
Impropriety Standard Supplanted the
Requirement of Demonstrating Prejudice
in Ex Parte Communications?
Honorable Charles F. Scott*
and Leo J. Delaney**

I.

INTRODUCTION

An ex parte communication occurs when a judge discusses a
pending or impending matter with a person interested in the outcome of the case and without notice to all the parties or their attorneys. Upon discovery of an ex parte communication, the excluded
party often moves that the trial judge withdraw from the case. If
the judge does not withdraw, the movant can contend on appeal
that the ex parte communication tainted the proceedings and mandates reversal. Since 1970, the rule in Illinois has been that an ex
parte communication with a judge does not require reversal of a
criminal conviction unless the defendant demonstrates that actual
prejudice resulted from the communication.'
In People v. Bradshaw,2 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District overturned two convictions because an ex parte communication created an appearance of impropriety.3 In so holding, the
court did not address the issue of whether the communication resulted in any prejudice to the defendants. The Bradshaw decision
engrafts upon existing ex parte law a standard designed and heretofore used only to govern ethical conduct.
This Article will first examine the actual prejudice rule as it has
* Circuit Judge, 19th Judicial Circuit; B.A., 1964, Northwestern University; J.D.,
1967, Northwestern University.
** Staff Attorney, 19th Judicial Circuit; B.A., 1983, Loras College; J.D., 1986,
Northern Illinois University.
1. People v. Hicks, 44 111.2d 550, 557, 256 N.E.2d 823, 827, cert. denied, 400 U.S.
845 (1970). See generally Lousin, The New Ex Parte Communication Rule in Illinois: A
Step Forward?, 19 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1031 (1988).
2. 171 I11.App. 3d 971, 525 N.E.2d 1098 (lst Dist.), appeal denied, 122 I11.2d 580,
530 N.E.2d 251 (1988). This case had two defendants: Bradshaw and Hines. Id. at 973,
525 N.E.2d at 1099.
3. Id. at 976-77. 525 N.E.2d at 1101.
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been developed and applied in Illinois.4 Then it will discuss and
analyze the Bradshaw opinion, arguing that Bradshaw creates an
improper standard for ex parte communications Finally, this Article considers the effect the decision will have upon both the criminal and civil law.6
II.

BACKGROUND

In 1970, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v.
Hicks7 established that actual prejudice is required before a criminal conviction will be overturned as the result of an ex parte communication.8 Subsequently, in People v. Dunigan,9 the Illinois
Appellate Court for the First District required a showing of actual
prejudice to overturn a criminal conviction based on an ex parte
communication.
A.

People v. Hicks

In Hicks, the defendant appealed his murder conviction, arguing
that on two occasions the trial judge had an ex parte communication with a woman who was supposedly a relative of the victim.' 0
In the first ex parte communication, there was a dispute over
whether the woman objected to a continuance of the trial in open
court or privately in chambers." The Illinois Supreme Court inferred from the record that the communication actually took place
in open court in the presence of defense counsel, and thus was not
an ex parte communication.' 2 In the second communication, the
trial judge received the woman into chambers where she requested
permission to sit in the front of the courtroom, which the judge
granted.13
4. See infra notes 7-29 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 30-69 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 70-88 and accompanying text.
7. 44 Ill. 2d 550, 256 N.E.2d 823, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 845 (1970).
8. Id. at 557, 256 N.E.2d at 827.
9. 96 II1. App. 3d 799, 421 N.E.2d 1319 (1st Dist. 1981).
2d at 557, 256 N.E.2d at 827. The supreme court found no support
10. Hicks, 44 I!1.
in the record for the defendant's contention that the communicant was related to the
victim, but acknowledged that she was in court as a potential "life and death" witness for
the prosection. Id.
11. Id. The communicant had voiced her objection to the continuance and expressed
her doubts that the defendant would ever be brought to justice. Id.
12. Id. The court noted: "[From the tenor of the record, it took place in open court
and in the presence of defendant's trial counsel, inasmuch as the latter, in recalling the
incident to the court, commented as follows: 'A special explanation was made on the
record to her at that time.' " Id.
13. Id.
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The Hicks court held that the trial judge's conversations, including the one in open court, did not warrant disqualification of the
judge.' 4 The court reasoned that to warrant disqualification, the
communication must rise to the level of unfairness or the
probability of unfairness in the trial. ,5 The court further reasoned
that the defendant had the burden of showing prejudice when motioning for substitution of judges. In ruling that the defendant
failed to sustain this burden, the court noted: "To say that any
involuntary meeting or conversation, no matter how trivial, gives
rise to cause for disqualification would present too easy a weapon
with which to harass the administration of criminal justice and to
obtain a substitution of judges."' 6
B.

People v. Dunigan

The Appellate Court for the First District applied the Hicks
legal standard in a situation in which a trial judge had ex parte
communications with the prosecuting attorney and the victims of
the crime for which the defendant was charged. In People v. Dunigan,'7 the defendant argued that two contacts with the trial judge
merited a reversal of his convictions.' 8 First, the defendant alleged
that the trial judge met ex parte with the assistant state's attorney
assigned to the case, a federal prosecutor, and an F.B.I. agent. 9
At the meeting, the judge read a memorandum about the defendant which he had just received from the federal prosecutor. The
State had never sent the memorandum to defendant's counsel and
it was not in the court file. 20 All conversation ceased when one of
the defendant's attorneys entered the judge's chambers. Then the
federal prosecutor provided defendant's attorney with a copy of the
14. Id. The court stated: "In our opinion, the judge's conversation with Mrs. Washington, one of which was in open court, did not give cause for his disqualification, or give
rise to either unfairness or a probability of unfairness which fatally infected the trial." Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 96 Il1. App. 3d 799, 421 N.E.2d 1319 (1st Dist. 1981).
18. Id. at 809, 421 N.E.2d at 1327. The defendant also alleged that the trial judge
had participated in ex parte communications prior to trial and had socialized with the
victims between the jury's verdict and the sentencing hearing. Id.
19. Id. at 810, 421 N.E.2d at 1328. The defendant's attorneys had subpoenaed the
United States Attorney's Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for production of
a relocated federal witness. Id. at 819, 421 N.E.2d at 1327. The U.S. Attorney served
notice that it would seek to quash the subpoena in accord with a memorandum of law
attached to the motion. Id. The parties were giving the judge a copy of the memorandum in chambers at the time of the ex parte incident. Id. at 810, 421 N.E.2d at 1328.
20. Id.
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memorandum. 2
In its analysis of the record, the appellate court determined that
22
no pretrial discussion occurred regarding the merits of the case.
The court noted that the sole support for the defendant's position
came from defense counsel's suppositions that such a conversation
had occurred prior to his arrival at the judge's chambers. 23 The
that mere conjecture is "not sufficient to warrant a
court concluded' 24
judge's recusal.
The defendant also sought reversal for a second ex parte communication between the trial judge and the defendant's victims. The
trial judge and the victims met by chance in a local tavern the same
night that the guilty verdicts had been returned. 25 The judge stated
that he and the victims discussed "generalities. ' 26 Thereafter, the
judge denied a motion that he withdraw before sentencing. 27 The
appellate court affirmed the convictions and the sentences because
the defendant failed to show prejudice. 2 The court did not find
any malice toward the defendant on the part of the trial judge and
21. Id.
22. At the hearing on the matter before the trial judge, the assistant state's attorney
testified that the federal prosecutor and F.B.I. agent came to her office on the morning in
question and they then proceeded to the chambers of the trial judge. Id. After she had
introduced them to the judge, the federal prosecutor handed him a copy of the memorandum. The federal prosecutor testified that after arriving in the chambers, he discovered
that the judge had not received a copy of the memorandum. He apologized and tendered
a copy to the judge. The judge started to read the memorandum as defense counsel
walked in the room. Both the federal prosecutor and the F.B.I agent testified that the
merits of the case were never discussed with the judge. Defense counsel testified that
although he did not receive a copy of the memorandum, he had not contacted the State's
Attorney's Office to obtain a copy. Id. at 810-11, 421 N.E.2d at 1328. He conceded that
he had no personal knowledge of the contents of any conversation prior to entering the
chambers, only that one had ceased when he arrived. Id. at 811, 421 N.E.2d at 1328.
23. Id.
24. Id. Additionally, the court stated:
[W]e find that the memorandum was not secretly furnished to the trial judge in
an effort to influence his actions. It was only through an administrative mishap
that the defense counsel did not originally receive a copy of the memorandum
.... Regardless of whether the trial judge read the memorandum in part or in
its entirely before defendant's attorneys arrived, its contents were not discussed
and no efforts were made to conceal it from defendant or his attorneys. In
short, defendant suffered no prejudice simply because the memorandum
reached the judge's hands moments before his attorney received a copy.
Id. at 811-12, 421 N.E.2d at 1329.
25. Id. at 812, 421 N.E.2d at 1329. The judge had stopped at the tavern at the invitation of one of the assistant state's attorneys after the return of the verdict. Id.
26. Id. The judge did not know that the victims would be at the tavern that evening.
He stated that he did not discuss the defendant's sentence or the outcome of the case with
them. An assistant state's attorney who was also present verified the judge's story. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 813, 421 N.E.2d at 1330. The exact issue, as framed by the court, was
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determined that the contact did not make prejudice likely.29
III.

PEOPLE v. BRADSHAW

A.

The Facts

In 1988, the Appellate Court for the First District was again
called upon to determine whether to reverse a conviction based
upon an ex parte communication at the trial level. In People v.
Bradshaw,30 the trial judge met in chambers with a deputy sheriff
who was assigned to the Criminal Courts building and who was the
mother of the victim in a case before the court.3 ' The incident
began when the judge's bailiff passed the judge a note while he was
on the bench.32 The judge recessed court soon thereafter and met
the deputy sheriff in his chambers. 33 Upon learning that the deputy sheriff was the victim's mother, the judge "terminated the conversation."34 Apparently, the judge did not disclose the meeting to
either defense counsel or the prosecution at that time.35
Prior to trial, defendant Bradshaw moved for substitution of
judges. 36 A second judge heard the motion and denied it.37 Subse"whether the trial judge was required to recuse himself by virtue of the meeting itself, in
the absence of evidence that the case was discussed." Id. at 812, 421 N.E.2d at 1329.
29. Id. at 813, 421 N.E.2d at 1330. The court stated:
We ...believe that the involuntary meeting that occurred between the judge
and the victims of the crime did not, in itself, disqualify him from presiding at
the sentencing hearing. Our review of the record reveals no malice directed
toward defendant by the trial judge as a result of his contact with the [victims],
and it is unlikely that this single event resulted in such an increased level of
emotional involvement as to make prejudice likely and disqualification
necessary.
Id.
30. 171 II1.App. 3d 971, 525 N.E.2d 1098 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 122 I11.
2d 580,
530 N.E.2d 251 (1988).
31. Id. at 974, 525 N.E.2d at 1100.
32. Id. at 974-75, 525 N.E.2d at 1100. There was some discrepancy over whether a
state's attorney or the court bailiff handed the note to the trial judge. In his pre-trial
motion, Bradshaw offered to have co-defendant Hines's mother testify that an assistant
state's attorney passed the index card to the judge. Id. at 974, 525 N.E.2d at 1100. During a hearing on a post-trial motion, Hines's mother and another woman testified that a
second deputy sheriff passed the note to the judge. Id. at 975, 525 N.E.2d at 1100. The
appellate court accepted the second version. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 976, 525 N.E.2d at 1101. The exparte communication was not made a part
of the record until Bradshaw made a motion for substitution of judges.
36. Id. at 974, 525 N.E.2d at 1100. Co-defendant Hines did not join in this motion.
Id.
37. Id. In his motion, Bradshaw, proceeding pro se, alleged that the trial judge was
prejudiced because the victim's mother had spoken with the trial judge. Id.
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quently, a jury found Bradshaw guilty of aggravated battery,
armed violence, and attempted murder.38 The trial judge found codefendant Hines guilty in a simultaneously held bench trial. In his
post-trial motion, Bradshaw renewed his argument concerning the
ex parte communication. 39 During a hearing on the post-trial motion, the trial judge confirmed that he had received a note from his
bailiff, which stated that "a deputy sheriff would like to see you,"
and that he adjourned the court and met with the deputy sheriff."
The judge claimed that upon learning the sheriff's identity he "terminated the conversation."'4 After denying the motions for new
trials, the judge sentenced the defendants to the penitentiary.4 2
B.

The Appellate Court's Decision

The appellate court reversed the defendants' convictions on the
basis that the factual scenario created an appearance of impropriety.4 3 The decision was based upon an ex parte provision of the
former Standards of Judicial Conduct which provided that: "Except ... as permitted by law, a judge should not permit private or
ex parte interviews, arguments or communications designed to in4
fluence his judicial action in any case, either civil or criminal."
Interpreting this and other rules governing judicial conduct, 4 5 the
Bradshaw court concluded that a trial judge has an obligation "to
recuse himself whenever necessary to protect the right of an accused to a fair and impartial trial."'4 6 The court explained that a
trial judge must assure the public "that justice is administered
38. Id. at 973-74, 525 N.E.2d at 1099-1100.
39. Id. at 974, 525 N.E.2d at 1100. In his post-trial motion, co-defendant Hines argued that he did not join in the pre-trial motion because he did not know about the ex
parte communication. Id. at 974-75, 525 N.E.2d at 1100. He also argued that he did not
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial because he did not know about
the ex parte communication. Id.
40. Id. at 975, 525 N.E.2d at 1100.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 973, 525 N.E.2d at 1099.
43. Id. at 976-77, 525 N.E.2d at 1101.
44. Id. at 975-76, 525 N.E.2d at 1101 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para.
61(c)(16)(1985)).
45. The court also considered ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 61(c)(4) (1987),
which provides that "[a] judge's official conduct should be free from impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety." Bradshaw, 171 Il1. App. 3d at 975-76, 525 N.E.2d at 1101.
In addition, the court referred to rule 17 of the Circuit Court of Cook County which
requires the disclosure of any ex parte communication in connection with any manner
pending before a court. For the text of rule 17, see infra note 49. Finally, the court
looked to the A.B.A. Standards, The Function of the Trial Judge 35-36 (Approved Draft
1972). Bradshaw, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 975-76, 525 N.E.2d at 1101.
46. Bradshaw, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 975, 525 N.E.2d at 1101.
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fairly" because the appearance of bias or prejudice can be just as
damaging to the public as actual bias or prejudice." Thus, the trial
judge must ensure that the rights of the accused are protected and
that the public impression will be favorable. " The court also noted
that the trial judge failed to inform the parties that an ex parte
communication had taken place as required by rule 17 of the Circuit Court of Cook County.4 9 The court reasoned that these judicial obligations required it to hold that a judge must recuse himself
even when the judge is personally convinced that he is not partial
to either side.50 The court held that recusal is mandated by the
appearance created when an officer of the court is a relative of a
party before the court and that officer passes notes to the judge and
immediately enters the judge's chambers. 5 '

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Actual Prejudice Requirement Ignored

The Bradshaw opinion ignored the actual prejudice standard established in Hicks and Dunigan. Furthermore, the decision overlooked two relevant facts. First, Bradshaw was convicted by a jury
that was not tainted by the ex parte communication. Second,
Hines did not join the pre-trial motion for substitution of judges,
which would normally waive the issue on appeal.52 Additionally,
47. Id. at 975-76, 525 N.E.2d at 1101.
48. Id. at 976, 525 N.E.2d at 1101 (citing People v. Austin, 116 Ill. App. 3d 95, 10102, 451 N.E.2d 593, 597 (1st Dist. 1983); ABA Standards, The Function of the Trial
Judge 35-36 (Approved Draft 1972)). The court also stated that "[tihe judiciary is bound
to maintain a favorable public impression that all defendants receive impartial trials
.... Id.
49. Id. Rule 17 states in pertinent part:
17.1 No judge shall permit and no lawyer shall engage in ex parte communications, unless allowed by law, in connection with any matter pending before said
judge. 17.2(a) If an ex parte communication in connection with any matter
pending before the judge occurs, the judge shall disclose the circumstance and
substance of said communication to all parties of record at the next hearing in
open court and, if a court reporter is available, on the record. 17.2(b) If a hearing is not scheduled within two full court days of said communication, the lawyer who has initiated said communication shall promptly serve a written
summary of the contents of said communication on all parties of record and the
judge.
ILLINOIS COURTS

RULE

BOOK, RULES OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY Rule

17.
50. Bradshaw, 171 Ill.
App. 3d at 976, 525 N.E.2d at 1101. The court stated that the
obligations to our system of justice remain steadfast "even though a judge is unequivocally sure that he is not partial to either litigant in a case pending before the court." Id.
51. Id.
52. See generally People v. Friedman, 144 Ill. App. 3d 895, 494 N.E.2d 760 (1st Dist.
1986); People v. Pettit, 114 I11.
App. 3d 876, 449 N.E.2d 1044 (2d Dist. 1983).
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the court did not discuss the content of the deputy sheriff's conversation with the trial judge and what prejudice, if any, 5may
have
3
resulted to the defendants as a result of that discussion.
The Bradshaw court accepted at face value the trial judge's representation that he terminated the conversation upon learning the
identity and interest of the deputy sheriff.54 The appellate court
stated: "[W]e do not imply that any improper motive existed on
the part of the trial judge."5 5 According to the court, the trial
judge learned nothing more than that the deputy sheriff was the
victim's mother. The Bradshaw opinion fails to indicate whether
the judge knew the deputy beforehand. The opinion does not mention the sheriff's success in making any arguments or communications designed to influence the trial judge's action in the case as
prescribed by the ethics rule then in force. 56 Absent any such factual findings, the contact with the deputy sheriff was an attempted
ex parte communication, in which case the convictions should have
been affirmed. In addition, under the Hicks and Dunigan prejudice
standard, the convictions should have been affirmed because no actual prejudice was shown by the defendants.
Accordingly, the Bradshaw decision signals a shift in the standard of review for an ex parte communication. Even if the judge
had made an immediate disclosure after meeting with the victim's
mother, the Bradshaw reasoning would have required recusal. The
court agreed with the defendants that "the trial judge erred in not
recusing himself from their case following his ex parte communication with [the victim's] mother."5 " The court stated that
"[a]lthough the judge maintains that he terminated the conversation when he ascertained the deputy sheriff's relation to the case,
at that point, the appearance of impropriety had already been created."58 Under Bradshaw, only recusal, and not mere disclosure, is
53. The court could have grounded its decision upon rule 17 of the Circuit Court of
Cook County, which provides that the judge must disclose any ex parte communication
in connection with any matter pending before the court to all parties at the next hearing
date following that communication. The court noted that: "[T]he record does not evince
that immediately following the ex parte communication the judge informed the parties
that an ex parte communication had taken place." Bradshaw, 171 I1.App. 3d at 976, 525
N.E.2d at 1101.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 61(c)(16) (1985). The court implied that because the appearance of impropriety was created prior to the time the communicant had
identified herself, her statements to the judge were immaterial. Bradshaw, 171 I11.
App.
3d at 976, 525 N.E.2d at 1101.
57. Bradshaw, 171 I11.
App. 3d at 975, 525 N.E.2d at 1100.
58. Id. at 976, 525 N.E.2d at 1101.
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available to the judge once an appearance of impropriety arises.
B.

Appearance of Impropriety

The fact that the ex parte communication in Bradshaw was made
by someone with an official status before the court apparently
weighed heavily in the appellate court's assessment of the appearance of impropriety. The Bradshaw court noted: "Here, [the victim's] mother was a deputy sheriff in the court building where
Bradshaw's and Hines' trials were being conducted. As a deputy
sheriff, she is a part of the justice system and therefore plays an
'59
integral role in the overall administration of justice.
The official status of the communicator presents a point of comparison between Bradshaw and its predecessors, Hicks and Dunigan. In Hicks, the ex parte communicator was supposedly the
victim's relative, but was merely a court spectator and not an officer of the court as in Bradshaw.' This distinguishing factor is
less evident in Dunigan, where the judge had conversations not
only with the victims, but also with the assistant state's attorney, a
federal prosecutor, and an F.B.I. agent. 6' Apparently, the Dunigan
court considered the meeting with the governmental officials harmless. The Bradshaw court did not share the Dunigan court's willingness to accept the characterization of a court officer's ex parte
communication with the judge as harmless error.
The Bradshaw court superimposes a higher standard upon criminal substantive law based on its interpretation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.62 Under Illinois law, granting a defendant's motion
for substitution of judges requires that the defendant show that the
"judge is so prejudiced against him that he cannot receive a fair
trial."' 63 Yet, the Bradshaw decision acknowledged that prejudice
need not be shown to prove that a defendant cannot receive a fair
trial. In light of the Greylord investigation, the Bradshaw court's
unstated concern may be that judges are less than candid in recounting the contents of ex parte communications and the effect
such communications have upon them. The words "appearance of
impropriety" supply a convenient shorthand to avoid weighing the
veracity of a judge's testimony. The Bradshaw court cautioned in
effect that if the circumstance of the ex parte communication ap59. Id.
60. See Hicks, 44 II1. 2d at 855, 256 N.E.2d at 826.
61.

62.
63.

Dunigan, 96 I11. App. 3d at 810, 421 N.E.2d at 1327.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, paras. 61-76 (1987).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-5 (1987).
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pears reprehensible, the judge must recuse himself irrespective of
good motives and the lack of prejudice.
V.

FUTURE USE OF THE "APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY"
STANDARD

A.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct

The Bradshaw decision is a crucial development in ex parte law
in light of the new ex parte rule in the Code of Judicial Conduct.'
The rule provides that a judge shall not permit ex parte communications concerning a pending proceeding.65 Unlike the former
rule, the new rule does not require that the ex parte communication be designed to influence a judge's judicial action in a case in
order to be culpable.66 Instead, the new rule prohibits the judge
from participating in communications concerning pending proceedings. 67 Therefore, an appearance of impropriety requiring
recusal is created when a judge bumps into a deputy sheriff, who
has an interest in a pending case, in a coffee shop and discusses the
latest Chicago Bears game.
The Bradshaw decision takes the rules one step further by making the content and context of the ex parte communication irrelevant.68 The length of the ex parte conversation, no matter how
brief, is no longer important. Moreover, the location of the communication is not significant, whether it occurred in the judge's
chambers, the coffee room, or on the street. It is now of little
weight whether the meeting was planned or accidental, whether
the communicator succeeded in imparting a message to the judge,
succeeded in convincing the judge of the communicator's position,
or succeeded in tainting and despoiling the judge to the prejudice
of the criminal defendants.
64. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Rule 63(A)(4), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para.
63(A)(4) (1987).
65. Id. The rule states that: "A judge should accord to every person who is legally
interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and,
except as authorized by law, shall not permit ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding." Id.
66. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 61(C)(16) (1985). The former rule provided:
"Except ... as permitted by law, a judge should not permit private or ex parte interviews,
arguments or communications designed to influence his judicial action in any case, either
civil or criminal." Id. (emphasis added).
67. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Rule 63(A)(4), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para.
63(A)(4) (1987).
68. For example, the record in Bradshaw did not disclose what words, if any, the
deputy sheriff spoke to the trial judge. See Bradshaw, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 975, 525 N.E.2d
at 1100.

1989]

People v. Bradshaw

1023

In establishing the appearance of impropriety standard, the
Bradshaw court has not only ignored the Code of Judicial Conduct, it has created a dangerous standard for recusal. Under Bradshaw, a judge can be removed from a case simply by an attempt at
discussing a case with a judge. Once an individual has gained entry to chambers, or gained a judge's attention in a parking lot or
restaurant, the appearance of impropriety is created, even if the
judge refuses to discuss the case. The Bradshaw rule creates a
tempting alternative for a defendant whose case is going badly.
The temptation may prove stronger than a defendant's interest in
fair play and ethical conduct. As stated by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Hicks, such a scenario presents "too easy a weapon with
which to harass the administration of justice and to obtain a substitution of judges." 6 9
B.

Civil Law

The arena of civil law does not have the stringent constitutional
demands as does criminal law. Nonetheless, the twin considerations of ethics and due process can lead to reversals of civil decisions because of an ex parte communication upon a showing of
prejudice.
A recent decision of the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District indicates that a judgment obtained without notice to the
opposing party can be construed as an ex parte communication requiring reversal. In City of Chicago v. American NationalBank &
Trust Co.,"° the court voided several orders that a trial judge entered on behalf of the City of Chicago because the opposing party
had not received notice of the hearing. 7 In reaching its decision,
the court considered the ethical aspects of the trial judge's actions
by addressing the ex parte communications which result when an
opposing party is not given notice of a hearing that proceeds in his
absence. 72
69. Hicks, 44 I11.
2d at 557, 256 N.E.2d at 827. In federal courts, motions alleging an
appearance of impropriety are brought under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982). In Liljeberg v.
Health Care Acquisition Corp., 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988), the United States Supreme Court
construed the federal rules of procedure to determine under what circumstances a judgment should be vacated when a judge fails to recuse himself. The Court concluded that a
reviewing court should consider "the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case,
the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of
undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process." Id. at 2204. This test combines the actual prejudice requirement with the appearance of impropriety rule.
70.

171 II1. App. 3d 680, 525 N.E.2d 915 (1st Dist. 1988).

71.
72.

Id. at 689, 525 N.E.2d at 920.
Id. at 689, 525 N.E.2d at 921.

1024

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 20

Justice Hartman, writing for the majority, reasoned that the trial
judge and the attorneys for the city must have engaged in ex parte
communications because there was no notice of the orders to the
party against whom they were directed.73 The court's opinion
seemed to combine the policy considerations which underlie the
rules against both ex parte communications and the appearance of
impropriety. The court stated:
In these changing times, with ever-increasing emphasis upon
moral conduct, lawyers and judges must become more acutely
aware of and attentive to ethical considerations, presently casting
deeper shadows of impropriety or its appearance than ever
before, with special attention to ex parte actions, which lend
themselves to suspicion by their very nature and often enough
turn up issues of due process violations when carefully
scrutinized.74
Although the opinion is not grounded upon a violation of the ex
parte communication, this language clearly indicates that obtaining
a judgment through
an ex parte communication can be the basis
75
for reversal.

The decision Fars v. Faris,7 6 though not an ex parte case, illustrates a rejection of the "appearance of impropriety" analysis in the
civil context. In Faris,the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second
District held that in an action for divorce, the wife of a judge is not
entitled to a change of venue from all the judges in the judicial
circuit where he sits, absent specific allegations of prejudice.77 The
judge's wife moved for a change of venue from all judges of the
Eighteenth Judicial Circuit because her husband practiced there
for many years as an attorney and had been appointed an associate
judge in that circuit shortly before trial.7 8 The trial court denied
the motion for change of venue because the former wife could not
73. Id.
74. Id. at 690, 525 N.E.2d at 921.
75. The dissent by Justice Scariano noted that this language is obiter dictum and
should have awaited a more appropriate case where the facts were better framed. Id. at
690, 525 N.E.2d at 922 (Scariano, J., dissenting). Justice Scariano stated:
Every effort was made to secure the transcripts relating to the events of the
crucial dates in this matter, but they are unavailable and are therefore not part
of the record on appeal; consequently, we do not know what representations
were made to the trial judge nor under what other circumstances the order was
entered.
Id. (Scariano, J., dissenting).
76. 142 Ill. App. 3d 987, 492 N.E.2d 645 (2d Dist.), appeal denied, 112 Ill. 2d 572,
497 N.E.2d 781 (1986).
77. Id. at 996, 492 N.E.2d at 652.
78. Id. at 990, 492 N.E.2d at 647. The wife filed her petition for change of venue on
February 20, 1985. The husband was to be sworn in as judge on February 28, 1985.
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show prejudice.79
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District affirmed.8"
Although the former wife argued on appeal that the facts presented
an untenable appearance of impropriety, the court found that a
petition for a change of venue from all the judges in a circuit must
contain specific allegations of prejudice and the question of
whether to grant the motion is left to the discretion of the trial
judge." The court noted that the Code of Judicial Conduct neither
specifically addressed the issue, nor did it suggest any impropriety
in hearing a case in which a judge is a party.82 In short, the change
of venue was properly denied because prejudice had not been
shown.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Schnake argued that an actual
showing of prejudice is not required where the facts show an appearance of prejudice.8 3 Justice Schnake observed that: "To avoid
the appearance of judicial impropriety is always of paramount importance." 84 Problems of this nature could easily be avoided, he
wrote, through the use of common sense and "routine administrative handling. "85
The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in Faris,6 but
Justice Simon filed a dissent stating that avoidance of the appearance of impropriety required that the motion for change of venue
be granted.

7

Justice Simon stated:

Here a judge of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit was being called
After the petition was denied, the matter proceeded to trial on February 27 and 28, 1985.
Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 998, 492 N.E.2d at 653.
81. Id. at 996, 492 N.E.2d at 652. The court found no Illinois decisions where a
judge is a party to a suit and the opposing party seeks a change of venue from all the
judges in the circuit. Id. Reasoning by analogy, the court required the same showing of
prejudice as for a change of venue from all the judges of a circuit or county where the
judge is not a party to the suit. Id. (citing Rosewood Corp. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 57
Ill. 2d 247, 311 N.E.2d 673 (1974)).
82. Id. at 997, 492 N.E.2d at 652 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 61 (1985)).
The court stated:
While judges in Illinois are subject to the standards of judicial conduct, the
standards do not specifically address the issue before us or suggest impropriety
in hearing a case in which a judge is a party. Accordingly, we reject wife's
contention that she is entitled to a change of venue from all judges of the eighteenth circuit as of right .

Id.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

. ..

Id. at 1004, 492 N.E.2d at 656 (Schnake, J., dissenting).
Id. (Schnake, J., dissenting).
Id. (Schnake, J., dissenting).
112 IlI. 2d 572, 497 N.E.2d 781 (1986).
Id. at 573, 497 N.E.2d at 781 (Simon, J., dissenting).
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upon to determine a matter involving a substantial financial interest of a new colleague. In order to forestall apprehension by
the petitioner and the public that favoritism could taint the outcome of the trial, the change of venue should have been
allowed.88
The present state of Illinois law presents a dichotomy between
criminal and civil law. If Bradshaw sub silentio dispenses with the
established requirement of actual prejudice in a criminal case, it is
at loggerheads with Faris, which strictly applies the established requirement of actual prejudice in a civil case. The result of this
conflict is that the test for a criminal motion for substitution of a
judge can be the appearance of impropriety, whereas a civil motion
for a change of venue requires of showing of actual prejudice.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It remains an open question whether Bradshaw establishes a narrow application of the appearance to impropriety rule to the decision's limited facts or a broad new criminal law rule dispensing
with the requirement of prejudice established by Hicks and Dunigan. The Illinois Supreme Court declined to address this issue
when it denied leave to appeal in Bradshaw.89 Because the Illinois
Supreme Court also denied leave to appeal in Faris,9" the courts
have yet to write the final word in the civil area of the appearance
of impropriety. Based on Bradshaw, judges may scrutinize claims
of prejudice with less reference to the facts surrounding the communication and find them to be proven when a reasonable suspicion, or some other lesser standard, is shown. Although the actual
prejudice rule of Hicks and Dunigan may yet prevail, future decisions will likely expand usage of the "appearance of impropriety"
standard established by Bradshaw.

88.

Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).

89.
90.

122 Il1. 2d 580, 530 N.E.2d 251 (1988).
112 I11.2d 572, 497 N.E.2d 781 (1986).

